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Abstract This paper attempts to identify behavioral patterns and compare their
average success considering several criteria of bounded rationality. Experimentally
observed choice behavior in various decision tasks is used to assess heterogeneity in
how individual participants respond to 15 randomly ordered portfolio choices, each of
which is experienced twice. Treatments differ in (not) granting probability information
and in (not) eliciting aspirations. Since in our setting neither other regarding concerns
nor risk attitude matter and probability of the binary chance move is (optimal) choice
irrelevant, categorizing decision types relies on parameter dependence and choice
adaptations. We find that most participants reduce systematically sub-optimality when
following the identified criteria.
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1 Introduction
Accepting that sub-optimality is nearly universal (see Conlisk 1996; Selten 2001;
and Gigerenzer 2006 for a review of the literature), we attempt to identify behavioral
patterns to improve decision success, by reducing the distance between individuals’
actual choices and the optimal ones. In this paper, the individual data previously
used by Di Cagno et al. (2017) via aggregating across individuals are analyzed to
assess individual heterogeneity in decision-making using several criteria of behav-
ioral improvement and of reasonable parameter dependence (Erev and Haruvy 2013;
Conte et al. 2015).
The experimental choice tasks are designed to unambiguously distinguish optimal
and sub-optimal choices and to avoid various idiosyncratic characteristics by which
one can rationalize such individual heterogeneity in decision-making. Specifically,
the decision tasks experimentally induce risk neutrality, have only individual conse-
quences and focus on numerical parameter constellations letting optimal choices not
depend on probability (information). We additionally distinguish optimality with and
without intra-personal payoff aggregation and partly elicit and incentivize aspiration
data.1 Moreover, since participants confront successively twice fifteen different and
randomly ordered choice tasks, we also can assess experience effect.
The experimental setup is designed to explore fundamental aspects of decision
theory. The decision tasks are framed as portfolio choices2 and employ binary lottery
incentives.3 Given an initial endowment, each subject allocates it between a risky asset
and a risk-free asset; both investment returns determine the probability (in points) of
winning the higher payoff (e14), rather than the lower payoff (e4), in both the good
and the bad state. The investment is set-optimal when one cannot obtain more in one
state without having to reduce what one obtains in the other state. Since deriving
the optimal investment, i.e., the investment maximizing the expected utility across
both states, may be cumbersome, participants could repeatedly use a slider before
committing to one slider position.
Satisficing is testable in the experimental treatments eliciting aspiration levels and
incentivizing optimal aspiration formation. Rather than only one aspiration in expected
utility terms, participants form payoff aspirations for each realization of the binary
random event (the good and the bad state), which allows to test set-optimal satisficing.
Satisficing, however, must not be (set)-optimal: an investment choice is satisficing
when its success in each random state guarantees the respective aspiration, i.e., when
the investment return in each random state is sufficient for what one aspires.
1 For an analysis of the concepts of aspiration and satisficing, see the seminal contributions of Simon (1955),
Siegel (1957) and Manski (2017) Sauermann and Selten (1962) and Selten (1998) for the adaptation theory
(AAT). For experimental analyses, see Selten et al. (2012) and Hey et al. (2017).
2 To avoid other relevant concerns, see Harrison and Johnson (2006).
3 This induces risk neutrality in decision-making (see Roth and Malouf 1979, for an early use in bargaining).
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Our previous aggregate data analysis concluded that, in spite of the weak ratio-
nality requirements, optimality and optimal satisficing are rare, and there is striking
heterogeneity in the individual behavior of participants within and across treatments.
The aim of this study is to investigate whether and how individual participants
are able to improve their investment decisions via reducing the distance between
their actual choices and the optimal ones. Since the familiar tools for rationalizing
individual heterogeneity in behavior are experimentally controlled or excluded, we
essentially categorize boundedly rational behavior via criteria of behavioral improve-
ment to confirm that participants learn and thereby enhance their success. Although
we are not born optimizers, we may still improve our success by learning. To achieve
this aim, we assess three basic criteria of behavioral improvement (improving slider
use, reducing antimonotonicity, improving when experiencing the same task again).
Improving according to these criteria should enhance individual success. In the treat-
ments eliciting aspiration levels, we additionally investigate improvement in aspiration
formation. Altogether, we find that our criteria of behavioral improvement are corre-
lated and enhance average success in terms of investment choices and the consequent
payoffs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally describes the
choice tasks. Section 3 presents the experimental protocols. Section 4 specifies the
improvement criteria, and Sect. 5 reports the evidence for the selected criteria, their
correlations and their use in identifying different behavioral types. Section 6 assesses
how improvement affects average success. Section 7 concludes.
2 Choice tasks and treatments
In each choice task (or case), the decision-maker is endowed with an integer amount
e(> 0) and decides which amount i , with 0  i  e, to invest in a risky asset, whose
variable repayment rate is r(i) = e − i in case of the good state (boom) and 0 in case
of the bad state (doom). The remaining amount e − i has a constant repayment rate
c > 0 , irrespective of good or bad state. The probabilities of boom and doom are p
and 1 − p with 0 < p < 1. Participants are subjected to binary lottery incentives;4
specifically, the choice of i determines the probability of earninge14 rather than only
e4.
The return from investing i in the risky asset and e − i in the safe one is (e − i)c
in case of doom and (e − i)(c + i) in case of boom. Since, due to the binary lottery
incentives, expected utility is the probability P(i) of earning more (e14) rather than
less (e4) and P(i) is restricted to 0 ≤ P(i) ≤ 1, the expected utility is given by
P(i) = (1 − p) · min {1, (e − i)c} + p · min {1, (e − i)(c + i)} (1)
Across all cases, one has (e − i)c < 1 via ec < 1. Thus, constrained optimization
requires to determine the level i for which
4 For a critical assessment, see Selten et al. (1999) which, however, questions expected utility theory,
not binary lottery incentives. Rejecting binary lottery incentives but maintaining expected utility theory is
impossible.
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Table 1 Cases and optimal choices
Case e c p i∗ P(i∗) P(i∗) P(i∗)
1 2 0.22 0.66 0.41 0.78 1 0.35
2 2 0.34 0.51 0.22 0.81 1 0.60
3 2 0.40 0.40 0.14 0.85 1 0.75
4 2 0.43 0.32 0.09 0.88 1 0.82
5 2 0.45 0.27 0.07 0.90 1 0.87
6 3 0.15 0.29 0.21 0.59 1 0.42
7 3 0.23 0.23 0.12 0.74 1 0.66
8 3 0.27 0.18 0.07 0.83 1 0.79
9 3 0.29 0.14 0.05 0.88 1 0.86
10 3 0.30 0.12 0.04 0.90 1 0.89
11 4 0.11 0.17 0.15 0.52 1 0.42
12 4 0.17 0.13 0.09 0.71 1 0.67
13 4 0.20 0.10 0.05 0.81 1 0.79
14 4 0.22 0.08 0.03 0.88 1 0.87
15 4 0.22 0.07 0.03 0.88 1 0.87
P(i) = (1 − p)(e − i)c + p · min {1, (e − i)(c + i)} (2)
is maximal.
So expected utility depends on the choice of i via [1 − P(i)] u(e4)+ P(i)u(e14),
with u(.) denoting the utility of money for all 0  i  e. Setting u(e4) = 0 and
u(e14) = 1 only assumes that more money, e14, is preferred to less, e4, and shows
that P(i) represents the expected utility of choice i .
Participants confronted the cases illustrated in Table 1, whose rows specify the
integer endowment e, constant repayment rate c, probability p, optimal investment
i∗ = e−c2 −
√
(e+c)2−4
2 , expected utility P(i
∗), as well ase14-probabilities P(i∗) and
P(i∗) in boom and doom implied by i∗. Due to i∗ being a corner maximum of the utility
curve, see the P(i) curve in Fig. 1, the positive probability p is not (optimal) choice
relevant but only payoff relevant. Thus, probability information and transformation
(see Kahneman and Tversky 1979 and Prelec 1998) do not matter for optimality.
The between-subject treatments design differs in information regarding probabili-
ties of the good and the bad state and aspiration elicitation: in treatments 1 and 3 (T1
and T3 hereafter), participants are aware of probability p, whereas in treatments 2 and
4 (T2 and T4 hereafter), no information about probability p is provided. The known (in
treatments 1 and 3) or unknown (in treatments 2 and 4) probabilities of boom and doom
are p and 1 − p, respectively, with 0 < p < 1. In treatments T3 and T4, participants
choose not only i but also their aspiration levels for the probability of earning e14 in
case of boom and doom, respectively, denoted by A and A, with A  A. In the fol-
lowing, we refer to A and A as aspirations. Since in boom and doom the probabilities
of earning e14 are P(i) = min {1, (e − i)(c + i)} and P(i) = (e − i)c, respectively,
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Fig. 1 Illustration of payoff incentives
the choice of i satisfies the aspiration profile (A, A) if P(i)  A and P(i)  A. With
the help of the choices i , A and A one can therefore test the satisficing hypothesis.
Satisficing is set-optimal if P(i) = A , P(i) = A and i satisfies 0  i  i∗. Oth-
erwise, one could increase P(i) without decreasing P(i) = 1, or vice versa. To test
(set-optimal) satisficing, aspiration formation is incentivized. A participant earnse14
with probability A or A when satisficing in boom or doom, respectively, and otherwise
nothing at all (meaning they earn e4 with probability 1). In particular, he experiences
“burning money” when sets an aspiration level lower than the probability implied by
its own investment choice (i.e., when P(i) > A or P(i) > A in boom and doom,
respectively) or experiences “committing suicide” when, on the contrary, he sets an
aspiration level greater than the probability implied by its own investment choice (i.e.,
when A > P(i) or A > P(i) in boom and doom, respectively. In treatment T2, which
does not provide probability information and does not elicit aspirations, participants
are asked for their (not incentivized) subjective probability pˆ of boom. This subjec-
tively stated probability pˆ in T2 and the aspirations A and A in T3 and T4 can be once
revised before confirming one’s choice of i without affecting the maximum number
of slider use (six) per choice task.
Figure 1 illustrates the i allocations and the related probabilities P(i), P(i), P(i).
3 Experimental protocols
The experiment consists of two phases with 15 rounds each, corresponding to the 15
cases in Table 1 which participants confront in idiosyncratic random orders.5 At the
beginning of each round participants are endowed with an amount of token which can
be allocated in a risk-free bond with a state-independent repayment factor (c in Table 1,
and a risky asset whose repayment factor changes with the market condition and the
5 Di Cagno et al. (2017) also analyze three control cases with c = 0.
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Table 2 The 2 × 2-factorial between-subject treatments
Choice Format Probability information
p given p unknown
T1 T2
I -treatment (direct i-choice) 1. i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6 1. pˆ
2. i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6
 final choice of i  final choice of i
T3 T4
S-treatment (first aspiration profiles, then choice) 1. A, A 1. A, A
2. i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6 2. i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6
 final choice of i  final choice of i
amount invested in it. The four treatments differ in terms of probability information
and aspiration elicitation. In T1 and T3, participants are informed of the probabilities
of boom and doom (p and 1 − p), about which they are unaware in T2 and T4 . Only
in T2, they report their beliefs pˆ and 1 − pˆ and only in T3 and T4 participants state
their aspirations A and A for both states, (not) knowing the probability p in T3 (T4).
The four treatments are depicted in Table 2.
Before choosing i , participants can test up to six choices of i by moving a cursor
on the scroll bar, as depicted in Fig. 2 for T1 and T26 (and in Fig. 4, in Appendix B,
for T3 and T4).7 The cursor allows participants to change the endowment share (i/e)
invested in the risky asset and thus the probabilities P(i) and P(i) of gaining e14,
which are represented by the left (right) column height in boom (left) or doom (right).
After confirming their final choice, participants proceed to the next round.
Let us illustrate the example in Fig. 2 with the endowment of e = 3, the repayment
factor for the risk-free bond c = 0.29, and probability of 14% (p) and 86% (1 − p),
respectively, for boom and doom.
In the example, the participant invests in the risky asset i = 1 which leaves for the
risk-free bond (e − i) = 2. This determines the probability of earning e14 and the
complementary probability of earning e4, which both depend on good or bad state.
In the good state, the probability of earning e14 is given by the sum of repayment
of the risk-free bond, c(e − i), and the repayment of the risky asset, (e − i)i . In the
screenshot, the probability of earning e14, calculated by the computer, is represented
by the height of the column corresponding to the good market condition. In this
example, the probability of earning e14 is approximately 80%.
In the bad state, the probability of earninge14 is given only by the repayment of the
risk-free bond, c(e − i). In the screenshot, the probability of earning e14, calculated
by the computer, is represented by the height of the column corresponding to the bad
market condition. In the example, the probability of earning e14 is approximately
6 The probability information is the only difference between T1 and T2.
7 In the experimental setting of T3 and T4 the aspiration level is set on the e14 bar probabilities and we
avoid confusion with the second (complementary) bar.
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Fig. 2 Investment choice in T1
50%. The translated instructions (see Appendix B) provide more details regarding
how treatments are described.
The altogether 30 choices i are the only choice data in T1. In T2, we additionally
elicit in each round the stated probability pˆ by asking participants to write down their
expectations regarding the probabilities of market in good or bad state, before the
investment choice (see instructions for treatment T2 in Appendix B). Similarly, in T3
and T4 we elicit in each round the aspirations A and A, by asking participants to assess
them before the investment choice (see instructions for treatments T3 and T4).
The experiment was performed in the Cesare Lab of Luiss University in Rome with
298 student participants. The number of participants per treatment varies from 71 to 78.
For each treatment, we conducted three sessions with student participants, recruited
using Orsee (Greiner 2004) from different fields of study (mainly Economics, Law
and Political Sciences). No one participated in more than one session. The experiment
was computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). The sessions lasted approximately
90 min. After each session, the participants answered a brief questionnaire, mainly to
collect demographic information, before being privately paid in cash for a randomly
selected round.8
4 Improvement criteria
Our data show that participants quite systematically behave sub-optimally. But do
participants learn to improve their success? In our setting, participants may learn in
three main ways:
8 Paying participants only for a random round is required by binary-lottery incentives and avoids past-
earnings effects.
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1. Improving slider attempts.
For each participant, denote by it∗ the last confirmed slider position. For partici-
pants with repeated slider attempts in the same task, one can investigate the last
slider adjustment it∗ − it∗−1, and, if available, the second-last ones, it∗−1 − it∗−2,
etc.
Based on this notation, slider use is improving for it∗ ≥ i∗ when
(1.1) it∗ < it∗−1 or
(1.2) it∗ ≤ it∗−1 ≤ it∗−2
with at least one weak inequality being strict.9
2. Reducing antimonotonicity
We define two types of antimonotonicity, timewise and casewise. More specifically,
denote by k = 2, . . . , 15 the round in a given phase in which a given participant
encounters a specific case.
Timewise monotonicity requests for two successive choices ik and ik−1 that (ik −
ik−1) has the same sign as (i∗k − i∗k−1), for the optimal choices i∗k and i∗k−1, i.e., if
(2.i) sign(ik − ik−1) × sign(i∗k − i∗k−1) > 0.
Casewise monotonicity (within a given phase) similarly postulates
(2.ii) sign(ik − ik′) × sign(i∗k − i∗k′) > 0 with k = k′.
The latter requirement is more demanding by allowing to compare every case k
with all 14 other cases k′, often separated by several intermediate cases between
k and k′. We, thus, measure as an improvement the reduction of the individual
frequencies of cases in which 2.i and 2.ii are not met.
3. Reduction of non-improving across phases
When confronting each case once again in a new random order, the second invest-
ment choice i being closer to i∗ in the sense of smaller max{0, i − i∗} is another
form of learning.
For a given case, we compare the two i-choices i1 in phase 1 and i2 in phase 2 of a
specific participant to asses individual improvement due to experience via reduc-
ing the frequency of improving choices across phases, specifically by identifying
non-improving for each case via
(3) max {i2 − i∗, 0} > max {i1 − i∗, 0}  0,
i.e., when for the given case, the 2nd-phase choice i2 is further away than i1 from
the optimal choice i∗. We thus measure experience by reducing the individual
frequency of cases with no improvement in the sense of (3).
Behavioral improvements altogether should increase the frequency of adjust-
ing i nearer to i∗ in the range i greater than i∗ and consequently reducing the
difference between P(i∗) and P(i), the expected loss due to sub-optimality. Addi-
9 In a similar manner, one could check slider positions for it∗−τ ≤ i∗ with τ = 1, 2 to determine whether
they return to the range [0, i∗] via it∗ ≤ i∗; however, such an analysis is omitted because only too few data
are available.
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tionally, behavioral improvement in T3 and T4 should reduce min
{
P(i) − A, 0} and
min
{
P(i) − A, 0}, “burning money”, and decrease the frequency of non-satisficing
via A > P(i) or A > P(i), “committing suicide”.
5 Improvement evidence
Participants differ in terms of how often they comply with improvement criteria. Obvi-
ously, some criteria apply only to some between subjects treatments, e.g., improving
slider use and antimonotonicity, are verified between phases while reduction of non-
improving is analyzed across phases. In the following, it will be shown that most
participants improve their behavior and that this is payoff enhancing.
5.1 Slider attempts, antimonotonicity and reduction of non-improving
According to Fig. 3, comparing earlier and later successive slider adjustments from
left to right in phases 1 (top) and 2 (bottom), slider adjustments on average become
smaller when approaching the final attempt it∗ .
In particular, the last slider adjustments significantly reduce the distance of the
actual investment from the optimal one (see Table 13 for average it∗ − i∗,it∗−1 − i∗,
it∗−2 − i∗ in phases 1 and 2 in Appendix A). Moreover, in phase 2, the distances of
the actual investments from the optimal investments are always smaller than in phase
1 (based on the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test—WSR hereafter—the difference between
Fig. 3 Adjustments in slider attempts for all treatments
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phase 1 and phase 2 is significant, p value < 0.001). Participants adjust mainly towards
the optimal investment in successive slider attempts and begin to adjust the slider more
carefully and more deliberately, before confirming their choice of i . Table 3 reveals
that (later) slider trials (more) significantly (at the 1% level) reduce the differences
between the actual and optimal i-choice across all cases.
Result 1 Aggregate tendencies suggest improvement on slider use.
Table 3 Correlations between slider adjustment trials and deviations from the optimal investment
Phase 1 Phase 2
it∗ − i∗ it∗−1 − i∗ it∗−2 − i∗ it∗ − i∗ it∗−1 − i∗ it∗−2 − i∗
Try −0.08∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.06∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.03∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.09∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.06∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.00
(0.01)
Constant 0.88∗∗∗
(0.03)
0.87∗∗∗
(0.03)
0.81∗∗∗
(0.05)
0.72∗∗∗
(0.02)
0.70∗∗∗
(0.03)
0.50∗∗∗
(0.05)
Observations 4530 4516 3484 4530 4523 3209
Standard errors are reported in parentheses
∗∗∗ significance at 1% level
Table 4 Correct slider use: movement to the optimal i∗ from the penultimate to the ultimate slider use
Phase 1 Phase 2 P value test mean
difference
Treatment 1 (2340 investment choices)
Choices 72.22% 76.58% 0.016
# subjects (rule > 50%) 69 (88.46%) 68 (87.18)% 0.343
# subjects (rule > 60%) 64 (82.05%) 62 (79.49%) 0.116
# subjects (rule > 70%) 43 (55.13%) 54 (69.23%) 0.000
Treatment 2 (2340 investment choices)
Choices 70.68% 74.87% 0.023
# subjects (rule > 50%) 70 (89.74%) 72 (92.31%) 0.030
# subjects (rule > 60%) 63 (80.77%) 67 (85.90%) 0.001
# subjects (rule > 70%) 48 (61.54%) 49 (62.82%) 0.523
Treatment 3 (2250 investment choices)
Choices 52.98% 48.98% 0.058
# subjects (rule > 50%) 44 (58.67%) 37 (49.33%) 0.000
# subjects (rule > 60%) 29 (38.67%) 31 (41.33%) 0.197
# subjects (rule > 70%) 15 (20.00%) 19 (25.33%) 0.003
Treatment 4 (2130 investment choices)
Choices 57.18% 57.65% 0.827
# subjects (rule > 50%) 46 (64.79%) 46 (64.79%) 1.000
# subjects (rule > 60%) 37 (52.11%) 53.52 (38%) 0.515
# subjects (rule > 70%) 16 (22.54%) 22 (30.99%) 0.000
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Table 5 Timewise antimonotonicity
Phase 1 Phase 2 P value test mean
difference
Treatment 1
Choices 39.65% 28.19% 0.000
# subjects (rule > 50%) 30 (38%) 11 (14%) 0.000
# subjects (rule > 60%) 15 (19%) 7 (9%) 0.000
# subjects (rule > 70%) 7 (9%) 6 (8%) 0.262
Treatment 2
Choices 44.51% 37.72% 0.001
# subjects (rule > 50%) 39 (50%) 27 (35%) 0.000
# subjects (rule > 60%) 20 (26%) 16 (21%) 0.000
# subjects (rule > 70%) 9 (12%) 6 (8%) 0.002
Treatment 3
Choices 48.29% 43.64% 0.033
# subjects (rule > 50%) 40 (53%) 33 (44%) 0.000
# subjects (rule > 60%) 21 (28%) 18 (24%) 0.031
# subjects (rule > 70%) 13 (17%) 14 (19%) 0.411
Treatment 4
Choices 59.05% 51.79% 0.001
# subjects (rule > 50%) 53 (75%) 46 (65%) 0.000
# subjects (rule > 60%) 36 (51%) 30 (42%) 0.000
# subjects (rule > 70%) 26 (37%) 15 (21%) 0.262
The analysis by treatment reveals large heterogeneity of improving slider use
choices in phases 1 and 2. In more detail, Table 4 indicates that the share of improving
slider use significantly increases from phase 2 to phase 1 only in treatments T1 and T2.
In our view, this is due to the fact that participants in treatments T3 and T4 have to
additionally focus on improving aspiration formation, i.e., the cognitive burden of aspi-
ration formation weaken “improving slider use” across phases. At the individual level,
one can categorize individual participants on the basis of improving slider use, by dis-
tinguishing three compliance levels of at least 50, 60 and 70%. A significant improve-
ment from phase 1 to phase 2 applies only to subjects at the 70% compliance level in
all treatments except for treatment T2 (see Table 4). These subjects, who better utilize
the slider, also should improve their average performance from phase 1 to phase 2.
Timewise antimonotonicity is greatly and significantly reduced from phase 1 to
phase 2 in all treatments (see Table 5). Although the percentage of anti-monotonic
choices is significantly greater in the cognitively more demanding satisficing treat-
ments, T3 and T4, the average tendencies reveal overwhelming improvement. In all
treatments, some participants defined as ‘anti-monotonic’ in phase 1 become ‘mono-
tonic’ in phase 2, i.e., learn to behave more consistently, for all compliance levels,
except the 70%.
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Table 6 Casewise antimonotonicity
Phase 1 Phase 2 P value test
mean difference
Treatment 1 (2340 investment choices)
Choices 40.5% 30.84% 0.002
# subjects (rule > 50%) 31 (39.74%) 19 (24.36%) 0.040
# subjects (rule > 60%) 22 (28.21%) 15 (19.23%) 0.190
# subjects (rule > 70%) 15 (19.23%) 13 (16.67%) 0.679
Treatment 2 (2340 investment choices)
Choices 44.99% 38.25% 0.028
# subjects (rule > 50%) 41 (52.56%) 30 (38.46%) 0.078
# subjects (rule > 60%) 29 (37.18%) 24 (30.77%) 0.401
# subjects (rule > 70%) 21 (26.92%) 15 (19.23%) 0.257
Treatment 3 (2250 investment choices)
Choices 48.50% 43.43% 0.106
# subjects (rule > 50%) 47 (62.67%) 35 ( 46.67%) 0.050
# subjects (rule > 60%) 36 (48.00%) 30 (40.00%) 0.327
# subjects (rule > 70%) 26 (34.67%) 24 (32.00%) 0.731
Treatment 4 (2130 investment choices)
Choices 56.16% 51.29% 0.101
# subjects (rule > 50%) 58 (81.69%) 47 (66.20%) 0.036
# subjects (rule > 60%) 51 (71.83 ) 46 (64.79%) 0.371
# subjects (rule > 70%) 38 (53.52%) 32 (45.07%) 0.317
The frequencies of casewise antimonotonicity are greatly and significantly reduced
from phase 1 to phase 2 in T1 and T2 (see Table 6) but to a lesser extent in T3 and
T4 where on the individual level we observe consistent improvement between phase
1 and phase 2 only at the 50% level of compliance.
As expected, also in the more cognitively demanding casewise antimonotonicity
there is an overall improvement of individual investment behavior.
Result 2 On average timewise and casewise antimonotonicity decrease from phase 1
to phase 2.
In contrast with other behavioral improvements, we cannot compare the reduction
of non-improving between phases 1 and 2.
Overall, Table 7 shows that the non-improving frequency is the smallest in treatment
T1 and is the highest in treatment T4 which requires to state the aspiration level without
any information on the probability of the good or bad state.
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Table 7 Non-improving frequency from phase 1 to phase 2
T1 T2 T3 T4
# subjects 78 78 75 71
Average 3.440 4.115 6.107 6.775
SD 2.541 2.763 3.047 3.067
Average non-improving frequency. The non-improving individual frequency is a variable from 0 to 15
Table 8 Pairwise correlation (using the threshold at 60%)
Correlation Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2
Slider use/casewise monotonic
Coeff. 0.1523 0.4772 −0.1061 −0.1105 0.2148 0.2985 0.1616 0.2731
p value (0.183) (0.000) (0.355) (0.336) (0.064) (0.009) (0.178) (0.021)
Slider use/timewise monotonic
Coeff. 0.0261 0.2848 0.0115 −0.1146 0.1293 0.2181 0.2685 0.1725
p value (0.821) (0.012) (0.921) (0.318) (0.269) (0.060) (0.024) (0.150)
Casewise monotonic/timewise monotonic
Coeff. 0.7785 0.6435 0.6418 0.762 0.5302 0.6882 0.6351 0.5346
p value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correlations between individual dummies for a threshold of 60%
5.2 Correlation among criteria
Pairwise correlating improvement in slider use and antimonotonicity reduction (see
Table 8) reveals a significant positive correlation between slider use and casewise
monotonicity in T1, T3 and T4 (in phase 2) but not T2. The correlation between slider
use and timewise monotonicity is less clear in spite of the always significantly positive
correlation between casewise and timewise monotonicity improvement.
Table 9 refines the correlation analysis between casewise and timewise monotonic-
ity improvements by differentiating between participants with small (< 60%) and large
(≥ 60%) shares of correct slider adjustments. Correlation of monotonicity improve-
ment is less relevant (although still significant) even for the smaller share of correct
slider adjustments (lower panel in Table 8).
Result 3 Across all four treatments, there are significant correlations between the
improvement criteria regarding slider use and monotonically reacting to cases.
5.3 Experience
We consider the experience based on the improvement criteria for phases 1 and 2
by combining participants into eight categories representing the average individual
tendency of using correctly the slider use, time/casewise monotonicity with the non-
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improving frequency across phases.10 Table 10 reports the non-improving frequency
separately for T1 and T2 and for phases 1 and 2, considering the other improving
criteria.11
The majority of participants are consistent (yes, yes, yes) with improving slider use
and both measures of anti-monotonicity reduction, and this category invariantly has
the lowest average non-improving frequency score in both T1 and T2 and both Phases
1 and 2; in particular, non-improving frequency drops in average from 3.21 to 2.82 in
T1 and from 3.46 to 2.80 in T2.12 Categories with no such reduction of the average
non-improving score usually contain rather few members.13
For treatments T3 and T4, we did not expect (see Table 10) the same low non-
improving scores as for treatments T1 and T2 because participants in T3 and T4 face
serious additional cognitive demands when forming aspirations A and A and trying
to avoiding “burning too much money” and “committing suicide”. Actually, the non-
improving scores, reported in Table 10, confirm our expectations.
Nevertheless, the non-improving frequency, separately for T3 and T4 and for phase
1 and 2, shows that all improvement criteria—“improving slider use”, “reduced anti-
monotonicity” and “reduced non-improving”—are highly correlated, as in T1 and T2.
Also, in this case, improving according to one criterion reliably predicts improvements
in the other ones: those participants consistently in line with the improving criteria
(yes, yes, yes) have the lowest non-improving score.14
Result 4 Participants learn to react qualitatively to parameter changes, as suggested
by optimality i∗.
Altogether, we conclude that all improvement criteria—“improving slider use”,
“reduction of anti-monotonicity” and less “non-improving”—are highly correlated:
improving according to one criterion reliably predicts improvements in the other ones,
where, of course, the categorization is partly binary (only non-improving frequency
is assessed numerically).
6 Success improvement
We distinguish different individual patterns based on individual compliance to
improvement criteria to point out possible effects on reducing the sub-optimality
P(i∗) − P(i). We adopt the improvement criteria, i.e., improving slider attempts,
10 We adopt the 60% individual level of compliance per phase.
11 The reason for distinguishing phases 1 and 2 in Table 10 is that the categorization of the eight behavioral
categories is independently performed for phase 1 and phase 2 data, i.e., an individual participant may
belong in phase 2 to a different class than in phase 1.
12 Table 14 (in the Appendix A) additionally controls for whether participants switch categories from phase
1 to 2. Again, the dominant categories are those with (yes, yes, yes)-participants in both phases (41 in T1
and 31 in T2), whose average non-improving score in phase 2 is 2.68 in T1 and 2.74 in T2, i.e. slightly
lower than the respective phase 2-score in Table 10.
13 An exception is phase 1 of T2 and the case (no, yes, yes), whose non-improving frequency score is 3.30
and thus smaller than the score of 3.46 for (yes, yes, yes).
14 Exceptions exist is phase 1 of T4, e.g. case (no, yes, yes) with only 7 participants whose non-improving
score is 5.43, less than 6.00 for (yes, yes, yes).
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Behavioral patterns and reduction of sub-optimality…
reducing timewise antimonotonicity and reducing casewise antimonotonicity which
generate the 8 categories in Table 9, without explicitly referring to non-improving fre-
quency15 but considering the relevant correlation with the other dimensions.16 Table
11, based on this 2 × 2 × 2-factorial improvement classification, i.e., the 8 rows in the
upper and lower subtable, reports the average expected success P(i) and the success
loss P(i∗) − P(i), separately for phase 1 and phase 2 (since individual participants
may belong to different categories in phases 1 and 2) and treatments T1 and T2. Par-
ticipants with “yes” for all three criteria represent the majority (48 or 56 in T1, and 37
or 45 in T2) with their number increasing from phase 1 to phase 2. Furthermore, the
success P(i) of earninge14 of this fully compliant group is generally the highest and
increases from phase 1 to phase 2. For T1 and T2, this result confirms that experience
enhances success.
Result 5 In treatment T1 and T2, participants compliant with the three improvement
criteria succeed in increasing the probability of earning e14, reducing the distance
P(i∗) − P(i). This success improvement increases from phase 1 to phase 2.
Because success in T3 and T4 depends not only on the investment choice i but
also on the aspirations A and A, Table 12 distinguishes for the same improvement
classification (the 8 rows) the average amounts of “burned money” P − A when
positive, separately for boom, P(i) − A, and doom, P(i) − A. In T4, the (yes, yes,
yes)-group of participants with “yes” for all three binary improvement criteria “burn”,
on average, the least amount in boom and doom and phase 2. For T3, the effect is less
pronounced.
Considering the high frequencies of “burning money” cases (see column frequen-
cies P > A in Table 12 which are almost 100% in both boom and doom) improvement
in satisficing occurs when burning less money in boom and doom. The same applies to
“committing suicide”, based on P(i) < A or P(i) < A, i.e. non satisficing. Nearly all
participants learn to avoid non-satisficing when transforming the visually displayed
column height (see Fig. 4 in Appendix A) into numerical aspirations, A and A.
Result 6 Participants compliant with the three improvement criteria succeed in reduc-
ing “burning money” (P − A), especially in treatment T4.
15 Thus, we obviously cannot refer separately to phases 1 and 2 and note the greater success in phase 2
than in phase 1.
16 In the following analysis, as in the previous, compliance with a selected criterion is calculated based on
60% average compliance.
123
D. Di Cagno et al.
Ta
bl
e
11
Su
cc
es
si
n
T1
an
d
T2
Co
rre
ct
sli
de
ru
se
Ti
m
ew
ise
m
o
n
o
to
ni
c
Ca
se
w
ise
m
o
n
o
to
ni
c
Tr
ea
tm
en
t1
Ph
as
e
1
Ph
as
e
2
#
su
bje
cts
%
o
f
o
f
th
e
to
ta
l
P
(i
)
SD
P
∗ −
P
SD
#
su
bje
cts
%
o
ft
he
to
ta
l
P
(i
)
SD
P
∗ −
P
SD
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
12
15
.3
8
0.
65
2
0.
05
8
0.
14
5
0.
05
8
3
3.
85
0.
66
1
0.
08
4
0.
13
6
0.
08
4
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s
0
0.
00
–
–
–
–
0
0.
00
–
–
–
–
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
4
5.
13
0.
61
3
0.
07
0
0.
18
4
0.
07
0
3
3.
85
0.
68
7
0.
01
3
0.
11
0
0.
01
3
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
48
61
.5
4
0.
74
5
0.
04
2
0.
05
2
0.
04
2
56
71
.7
9
0.
76
7
0.
02
4
0.
03
0
0.
02
4
N
o
N
o
N
o
3
3.
85
0.
57
6
0.
03
5
0.
22
1
0.
03
5
4
5.
13
0.
62
5
0.
06
3
0.
17
2
0.
06
3
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
3
3.
85
0.
48
7
0.
07
6
0.
31
0
0.
07
6
5
6.
41
0.
60
2
0.
11
1
0.
19
5
0.
11
1
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
0
0.
00
–
–
–
–
0
0.
00
–
–
–
–
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
8
10
.2
6
0.
69
6
0.
06
1
0.
10
1
0.
06
1
7
8.
97
0.
74
8
0.
09
7
0.
04
9
0.
09
7
To
t.
su
bje
cts
78
78
Co
rre
ct
sli
de
ru
se
Ti
m
ew
ise
m
o
n
o
to
ni
c
Ca
se
w
ise
m
o
n
o
to
ni
c
Tr
ea
tm
en
t2
#
su
bje
cts
%
o
fo
f
th
e
to
ta
l
P
(i
)
SD
P
∗ −
P
SD
#
su
bje
cts
%
o
ft
he
to
ta
l
P
(i
)
SD
P
∗ −
P
SD
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
15
19
.2
3
0.
68
0
0.
03
7
0.
11
7
0.
03
7
15
19
.2
3
0.
70
3
0.
05
2
0.
09
4
0.
05
2
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s
1
1.
28
0.
76
3
0.
03
4
0.
00
–
–
–
–
–
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
10
12
.8
2
0.
66
0.
06
2
0.
13
4
0.
06
2
7
8.
97
0.
68
7
0.
04
3
0.
11
0
0.
04
3
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
37
47
.4
4
0.
73
7
0.
03
7
0.
06
0
0.
03
7
45
57
.6
9
0.
77
2
0.
01
6
0.
02
4
0.
01
6
123
Behavioral patterns and reduction of sub-optimality…
Ta
bl
e
11
co
n
tin
ue
d
Co
rre
ct
sli
de
ru
se
Ti
m
ew
ise
m
o
n
o
to
ni
c
Ca
se
w
ise
m
o
n
o
to
ni
c
Tr
ea
tm
en
t2
#
su
bje
cts
%
o
fo
f
th
e
to
ta
l
P
(i
)
SD
P
∗ −
P
SD
#
su
bje
cts
%
o
ft
he
to
ta
l
P
(i
)
SD
P
∗ −
P
SD
N
o
N
o
N
o
3
3.
85
0.
59
0
0.
05
1
0.
20
7
0.
05
1
1
1.
28
0.
57
6
0.
22
1
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
1
1.
28
0.
51
4
0.
28
3
1
1.
28
0.
59
0
0.
29
2
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
1
1.
28
0.
72
5
0.
07
2
0
0.
00
–
–
–
–
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
10
12
.8
2
0.
74
8
0.
03
4
0.
04
9
0.
03
4
9
11
.5
4
0.
75
2
0.
07
3
0.
04
5
0.
07
3
To
t.
su
bje
cts
78
78
D
um
m
ie
sw
ith
a
th
re
sh
ol
d
o
f6
0%
123
D. Di Cagno et al.
Ta
bl
e
12
Su
cc
es
si
n
T3
an
d
T4
Co
rre
ct
sli
de
r
u
se
Ti
m
ew
ise
m
o
n
o
to
ni
c
Ca
se
w
ise
m
o
n
o
to
ni
c
Tr
ea
tm
en
t3
(B
oo
m)
Ph
as
e
1
Ph
as
e
2
#
su
bje
cts
%
o
ft
he
to
ta
l
P
−
A
if
P
>
A
SD
Fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s
P
>
A
(%
)
#s
ub
jec
ts
%
o
ft
he
to
ta
l
P
−
A
if
P
>
A
SD
Fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s
P
>
A
(%
)
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
6
8
0.
28
7
0.
09
2
98
4
5
0.
09
2
0.
16
1
97
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s
0
0
–
–
0
0
0
–
–
0
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
4
5
0.
29
0
0.
14
9
98
3
4
0.
20
5
0.
21
0
98
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
18
25
0.
27
2
0.
14
7
94
24
33
0.
28
7
0.
19
2
96
N
o
N
o
N
o
13
18
0.
32
2
0.
06
7
99
14
19
0.
30
5
0.
08
4
10
0
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
13
18
0.
32
0
0.
09
6
98
9
12
0.
33
5
0.
11
4
98
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
2
3
0.
27
0
0.
06
9
10
0
0
0
–
–
0
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
17
23
0.
33
4
0.
09
3
98
19
26
0.
33
0.
10
8
98
To
ta
ls
u
bje
cts
73
73
Co
rre
ct
sli
de
r
u
se
Ti
m
ew
ise
m
o
n
o
to
ni
c
Ca
se
w
ise
m
o
n
o
to
ni
c
Tr
ea
tm
en
t3
(D
oo
m)
Ph
as
e
1
Ph
as
e
2
#
su
bje
cts
%
o
ft
he
to
ta
l
P
−
A
if
P
>
A
SD
Fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s
P
>
A
(%
)
#s
ub
jec
ts
%
o
ft
he
to
ta
l
P
−
A
if
P
>
A
SD
Fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s
P
>
A
(%
)
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
5
8
0.
15
7
0.
10
1
81
4
6
0.
18
4
0.
15
9
83
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s
0
0
–
–
0
0
0
–
–
0
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
4
6
0.
15
1
0.
10
5
85
3
4
0.
14
0
0.
07
4
93
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
19
30
0.
27
6
0.
11
1
87
23
33
0.
28
5
0.
18
2
90
123
Behavioral patterns and reduction of sub-optimality…
Ta
bl
e
12
co
n
tin
ue
d
Co
rre
ct
sli
de
r
u
se
Ti
m
ew
ise
m
o
n
o
to
ni
c
Ca
se
w
ise
m
o
n
o
to
ni
c
Tr
ea
tm
en
t3
(D
oo
m)
Ph
as
e
1
Ph
as
e
2
#
su
bje
cts
%
o
ft
he
to
ta
l
P
−
A
if
P
>
A
SD
Fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s
P
>
A
(%
)
#s
ub
jec
ts
%
o
ft
he
to
ta
l
P
−
A
if
P
>
A
SD
Fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s
P
>
A
(%
)
N
o
N
o
N
o
10
16
0.
11
9
0.
09
5
68
13
19
0.
11
8
0.
05
6
73
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
9
14
0.
16
2
0.
11
4
73
7
10
0.
16
1
0.
13
8
58
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
1
2
0.
24
6
–
10
0
0
0
–
–
10
0
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
16
25
0.
24
4
0.
09
3
88
20
29
0.
26
9
0.
11
8
80
To
ta
ls
u
bje
cts
64
70
Co
rre
ct
sli
de
r
u
se
Ti
m
ew
ise
m
o
n
o
to
ni
c
Ca
se
w
ise
m
o
n
o
to
ni
c
Tr
ea
tm
en
t4
(B
oo
m)
Ph
as
e
1
Ph
as
e
2
#
su
bje
cts
%
o
ft
he
to
ta
l
P
−
A
if
P
>
A
SD
Fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s
P
>
A
(%
)
#s
ub
jec
ts
%
o
ft
he
to
ta
l
P
−
A
if
P
>
A
SD
Fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s
P
>
A
(%
)
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
14
19
.7
2
0.
30
9
0.
09
5
98
11
15
.4
9
0.
30
2
0.
12
5
10
0
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s
0
0.
00
–
–
0
1
0.
32
2
–
–
0
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
10
14
.0
8
0.
26
6
0.
13
0
99
9
12
.6
8
0.
22
6
0.
13
4
98
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
13
18
.3
1
0.
21
3
0.
15
0
99
17
23
.9
4
0.
08
7
0.
10
2
99
N
o
N
o
N
o
22
30
.9
9
0.
33
9
0.
07
6
98
16
22
.5
4
0.
33
6
0.
13
9
98
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
5
7.
04
0.
30
9
0.
05
3
84
10
14
.0
8
0.
36
2
0.
13
1
97
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
0
0.
00
–
–
0
0
0.
00
–
–
0
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
7
9.
86
0.
30
4
0.
10
9
99
7
9.
86
0.
18
0
0.
18
3
99
To
ta
ls
u
bje
cts
71
71
123
D. Di Cagno et al.
Ta
bl
e
12
co
n
tin
ue
d
Co
rre
ct
sli
de
r
u
se
Ti
m
ew
ise
m
o
n
o
to
ni
c
Ca
se
w
ise
m
o
n
o
to
ni
c
Tr
ea
tm
en
t4
(D
oo
m)
Ph
as
e
1
Ph
as
e
2
#
su
bje
cts
%
o
ft
he
to
ta
l
P
−
A
if
P
>
A
SD
Fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s
P
>
A
(%
)
#s
ub
jec
ts
%
o
ft
he
to
ta
l
P
−
A
if
P
>
A
SD
Fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s
P
>
A
(%
)
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
12
18
.4
6
0.
16
5
0.
08
4
89
11
16
.6
7
0.
13
7
0.
09
2
92
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s
0
0.
00
–
–
0
1
1.
52
0.
29
0
–
10
0
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
10
15
.3
8
0.
16
4
0.
09
1
81
8
12
.1
2
0.
16
5
0.
11
0
90
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
13
20
.0
0
0.
14
6
0.
08
1
86
17
25
.7
6
0.
10
1
0.
07
9
91
N
o
N
o
N
o
19
29
.2
3
0.
13
5
0.
06
1
77
15
22
.7
3
0.
15
5
0.
07
9
77
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
4
6.
15
0.
18
8
0.
10
9
55
7
10
.6
1
0.
22
1
0.
15
3
69
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
0
0.
00
–
–
0
0
0.
00
–
–
0
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
7
10
.7
7
0.
23
8
0.
09
2
80
7
10
.6
1
0.
16
5
0.
12
8
85
To
ta
ls
u
bje
cts
65
66
D
um
m
ie
sw
ith
a
th
re
sh
ol
d
o
f6
0%
123
Behavioral patterns and reduction of sub-optimality…
7 Conclusions
Our previous analysis reported in Di Cagno et al. (2017) shows nearly exclusive
sub-optimality, irrespective of whether optimality is interpreted as expected utility
maximization or in the set-optimal sense of not being able to do better in boom with-
out harming success in doom, or vice versa. Sub-optimality is revealed by positive
differences i − i∗ (as all i  i∗ are at least set-optimal). Further, sub-optimality is
revealed by treatments eliciting aspirations via “burning money”, which is still con-
sistent with satisificing, and “committing suicide”, which violates satisficing.
From this starting point, we have identified different criteria for how well partic-
ipants manage to reduce sub-optimality and improve their success, for example, by
letting max {0, i − i∗}, P(i) − A and P(i) − A, when positive, shrink. One criterion
applies to successive slider attempts before confirmation. Another improvement aspect
is to react qualitatively to parameter changes in the optimal investment level i∗ in the
sense of timewise and casewise monotonicity. Finally, individual improving can be
assessed since all 15 tasks are confronted twice, once in the first phase and once in the
second phase.
We have used all criteria to demonstrate that most participants systematically reduce
sub-optimality and thereby considerably enhance their success. Participants still do
not behave optimally, but, being only boundedly rational, they learn how to improve
decision-making. Actually nearly all of them become satisficers.17 Even for those
participants who still score poorly in terms of the improvement criteria, it seems
possible that improving how to use the slider and listen to advice, for example, that
max {0, i − i∗} is sub-optimal, will also help them improve their decision-making.
We hope to explore in future research if some sort of advice could speed up behav-
ioral improvements and possibly avoids sub-optimality altogether.
Appendix
See Fig. 4 and Tables 13, 14.
17 We admit that our method of incentivizing aspiration formation by letting participants lose all chances
of earning more e14, rather than only e4 is partly responsible for the striking confirmation of satisficing,
at least in phase 2 of treatments T3 and T4.
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Fig. 4 Investment choice in T3 and T4
Table 13 Summary results regarding slider adjustments
Variable Phase 1 Phase 2
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD
it∗ − i∗ 4530 0.551 0.745 4530 0.413 0.688
it∗−1 − i∗ 4516 0.640 0.841 4523 0.486 0.782
it∗−2 − i∗ 3484 0.659 0.824 3209 0.477 0.760
it∗−3 − i∗ 2888 0.732 0.828 2527 0.533 0.787
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